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INTRODUCTION
In 1785, two men came into important government positions in New
Spain who had considerable influence on the Indian policies of the
Spanish frontier.
y Loyola.
the crown.

These men were Bernardo de Galvez and Jacobo Ugarte

Both had proven their competence through earlier services to
Galvez had come to the new world while still a relatively

young man in 1769.

Due to his own accomplishments, and the watchful

eye of his uncle, Jose de Galvez, Bernardo advanced rapidly.

He first

served on the Louisi.ana frontier as a military officer, and in time
rose to become governor of that province.
war on England, Galvez

In 1779, when Spain declared

directed the conquest of British posts on the

lower Mississippi River and the capture of the Bahamas.

On the death

of his father, Viceroy Mat!as de Galvez, in 1785, he was sent to Mexico
to succeed him as viceroy of New Spain.

1

Jacobo Ugarte y Loyola had proven himself a capable soldier in
wars with Portugal and Italy.

In 1769, he had been dispatched to

New Spain to serve as military governor of the frontier provinces.

2

1
Donald E. Worchester, ed., Instructions for Governing the Internal
Provinces of New Spain. 1786, by Bernardo de G~lvez, hereafter cited as
Instructions (New York: Arne Press, 1967), p. 22. For farther information on Galvez while governor of Louisiana see also Herbert Eugene
Bolton, Athanaze de Mezieres and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier (Cleveland,
Ohio: Arthur Clark Co,, 1914).
2
Max L. Moorhead, The Apache Frontier (Norman, Oklahoma:
of Oklahoma Press, 1968), p. 19.

University

In 1776, when the Council of the Indies formed a new frontier policy
which separated the regions of Sonora, Coahuila, New Mexico and Texas
from the vice royalty of New Spain, Ugarte was appointed military
governor of Sonora.
This reorganization of the frontier was due largly to the increased
pressure of the Apache raids on the northern settlements.

The new

region, known as the Frovinaiae IntePnae, was under the direct military
rule of Teodoro de Croix.

3

The increased Apache problems were there-

sults of territorial expansion to the southwest by the Commanches.
These two Indian groups were traditional enemies, and as the more powerful Commanches gained ground in the east, the Apaches moved farther into
the Spanish domain.

The minister of the Indies, Jose de Galvez, was con-

vinced that this threat could only be stopped by a coordinated effort of
all the military forces on the frontier, which brought about the realignment of command in the area. 4
In 1785, at approximately the same time as Bernardo de Galvez became viceroy of New Spain, Jacobo Ugarte was appointed the commander
general of the P.rovinaiae IntePnas.

Ugarte, in his position as commander

general, had full charge of all military activit ies on the northern frantier and was directly responsible only to Viceroy Galvez.
of 1786, Galvez fell victim of a fever and died.

In the fall

Before his death,

3
worchester, Instructions, pp. 1 2-1 3. For further informa ti on on
Teodoro de Croix see also Alfred Barnaby Thomas, Teodoro de Croix and
the Northern Frontier of New Spain. 1776-1783 (Norman Olkahoma:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1941).
4

Ibid., p. 13.

3

however, he outlined a very promising plan to Ugarte for improving the
situation on the frontier.
The Galvez policy for dealing with all Indians on the frontier in
general, and the Apaches in particular, was perhaps the most important
plan ever adopted by the Spanish for control
northern provinces of New Spain.
its

of the Indians of the

It worked for twenty-four years--from

inception in 1786 until the latter part of 1810, when it collapsed

due to lack of use during the Mexican independence movement.
This paper will attempt to assess the reasons for the effectiveness
of this policy, its impact upon the Indians--particularly the Apaches-and look at the Spanish military of the late 1700's in the southwest.
To understand the need for formation of the Galvez policy it will be
necessary to review briefly the history of the Apaches to 1760, the
situation of the Spanish on the frontier, initial Spanish Indian policies
from 1766 to 1785 and to look in depth at the policy of Bernardo de
Galvez.

4

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE APACHES TO 1760
The land of the Apaches by the eighteenth century was generally
located north of the present boundary of the United States and Mexico,
from the upper reaches of the Colorado River of Texas to the headwaters
of the Santa Cruz River in Arizona,

From the grassy plains of Texas

it merged into the pine-clad mountains of New Mexico and then into the
sterile desert region of Arizona.
sparsely inhabited.

It was a harsh land that was only

5

The Spanish conception of Ap&che lands, which they called the Gmn

ApacheP!a, was somewhat smaller than the true area over which the Apaches
roamed.

The Spaniards considered an area 750 miles in breadth--from the

ninety-eighth to the one hundred eleventh meridian--and 550 miles in
length--from the thirtieth to thirty-eighth parallels--to be the Apache
region.

6

The main area of mbitation of the Apaches was the region now

known as the American Southwest.

However, when they were raiding they

penetrated through the Texas frontier deep into Mexico. 7
Linguistically, and to a lesser degree culturally, the Apaches were
a united nation.
8

group.

The Apaches were of the Southern Athapaskan language

Traditionally a nomadic and predatory people, they remained that

5
Moorhead, The Apache Frontier, p . 3.
6

Ibid., p. 3.

7

Robert G. Ferris, editor, Soldier and Brave (Washlngton , D. c.:
National Park Service, 1971), p. 15.
8

Moorhead, The Apache Frontier, p. 4.

way until the last half of the nineteenth c entur y when the United Stat es
Army forced them into a sedentary existence on reservations.
Politically, the Apaches were almost never unified.

They were made

up of various separate tribal groups, which were then divided into even
smaller clans and family groups.

By the early part of the eighteenth

century, the Spanish had begun to realize these tribal distinctions and
to locate the general geographic regions occupied by each group.

Those

on the upper reaches of the R!o Gi la and beyond the northeastern edge of
Sonora were the Gileno.

In southwestern New Mexico were found the

Chirichahua; to the northeast the Jicarilla; down the R{o Grande and extending into the valley of the R!o Pecos were the other branches of the
Apache family, notably the Natage, the Mescalero and the Lipan. 9
The Apaches had become "horse Indians" by the 1690's, and this made
them a most formidable opponent for the Spanish.

Moreover, they had still

not learned all the techniques of stock breeding and were dependent upon
the Spanish for additional horses, which was one of the main reasons
for continued raiding by the Apaches.
quite fond of the cattle and

10

Also, the Indians had

mules of the Spanish for food.

become

These

factors served to attract the Apaches int o Spanish occupied regions .

The

Spanish inhabitants of the northern frontier were so terrified of the
Apaches that they were prone to call any hostile Indian an "Apache."
While the search for lorses and food served to attract the Apaches into
Spanish occupied regions, forces were at work to the east that would
9
John Francis Bannon, The Spanish Borderlands Frontier. 1 513 -1821,
hereafter cited as Borderlands (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
197 0)' p. 170.
10

Ibid., p. 170.

drive the Indians into open conflict with the Spanish.

By 1750 the

Commanches were expanding their territory to the western reaches of
Texas and eastern New Mexico, displacing fue Apaches as they went.
The Commanches had obtained horses only shortly after the Apaches,
and by the mid-1700's were the most accomplished horsemen of the plains.
Their equestrian skills increased their power, and the Commanches were
soon the most feared warriors in the entire west.

As the more powerful

Commanches pushed the Apaches westward, the Apaches vigorously attacked
the Spanish as they sought to acquire new territory.

By the 1760's

then, the entire northern border of New Spain was in constant peril from
the Apaches.

THE SPANISH SITUATION IN THE NORTHERN PROVINCES
The northern area of New Spain was of great importance to the
Spanish from a strategic point of view.

It served as a buffer zone be-

tween the riches of Mexico and the feared onslaught of the French , English
and Russians from the north.

The Spanish were inclined to be very fear-

ful of intrusions into Mexico by their European rivals.

They particu-

larly were leery of the safety of their silver mines of northern Mexico.
By the first half of

the eighteenth century, the French had become very

active in the Mississippi Valley, British fur trappers were ranging as
far south as present-day Utah, and the Russian threat, real or imagined,
along the Pacific coast also concerned the Spanish.

It was fear of the

Russians that motivated Spanish expansion to the northwest of New Spain
into the area known as California.

However, by the mid -1700's, the real

threat in the Spanish Borderlands was not from Spain's European rivals,
but from unfriendly Indians, especially the Apaches.
Spanish society on the frontier advanced in the form of three basic
institutions--mission, presidio and civilian settlement . 11
institutions was closely linked to its counterparts .

Each of these

As the missionaries

or civilian interests advanced the frontier northward, either for God or
for earthly wealth, they were accompanied by the military for protection
and as a safeguard to watch over the interests of the crown.
interest in the northern frontier was aroused in 1736

Civilian

when a Yaqui

Indian reported to a Sonoran merchant that silver could be found to the
11
Joseph A. Stout, Jr., and Odie B. Faulk, A Short History of the
American West (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 18.

8

north.

The merchant repeated the story, and the result was a stampede

of bonanza proportions.

This Real de Arizonac, as it was called, proved

to be incredibly rich.

An estimated 5,000 to 10,000 miners and merchants

rushed into the area.

12

While this strike lasted only a few months,

there continued to be a sufficient amount to mining in the north to
attract a substantial civilian population.
The Mission System
Perhaps the most remarkable institution to develop on the frontier
was the Spanish mission.

The mission was a tough pioneering agency that

served as church, home, fortress, town, farm and imperial consulate.

This corporate body made it possible for two missionaries with three or
four soldiers to create an orderly settlement out of several thousand
Indians.

13

The primary purpose of the mission was to Christianize the Indians,
and secondary to that goal was economic development and some degree of
social discipline.

The mission, as an arm of the state, also worked as

a defensive fortress before the presidios were manned.

14

The missionary

work on the northern borders of New Spain was conducted largely by
Jesuits, Franciscans and Dominicans.

The work to the north and west of

12~ .• p. 48.
13

Robert V. Hine, The American West: An Interpretive History
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), p. 10.

14~ .• p. 10.

New Spain was done mainly by the Jesuits, who were especially active in
Sonora, Chihuahua, lower California and Arizona.

15

The Jesuits first came to New Spain in 1572, when a wealthy Spaniard
named Don Alonso de Villaseca provided the funds for a missionary venture
into the area.

Twelve years after the first Jesuits arrived in Mexico, a

group of twenty-three moved into the northern provinces.

After a few

decades, the number of missionaries had increased to twenty-seven fathers
and several brothers.

16

While the first Jesuit missions in the north were on the coast
and in the province of Nueva Vizcaya, by the early eighteenth century
they had expanded into Arizona with great fervor.

17

The foremo s t pioneer

in Arizona and lower California was a Jesuit priest named Eusebio
Francisco Kino.
into Arizona.

By 1702, Kino had pushed northward from Baja California
His was a unique ministry in that he taught more than

Christianity; he showed the natives how to farm and ranch, how to plant
and cultivate crops and

how to prepare new foods.

By the turn of the

eighteenth century he had established three missions in present-day
Arizona.

18

15
Herbert Eugene Bolton and Thomas M. Marshall, The Colonization of
North America 1492-1783 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1922), p . 236.
16
Peter Master Dunne, Pioneer Jesuits in Northern Mexico (Berkeley,
Calif: University of California Press, 1944) pp. 4-8. For further information on the Jesuits in New Spain see also by Dunne, Black Robes in
Lower California (Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1952);
and Jacobs Sedelmayr: Missionary, Frontiersman, Explorer in Arizona and
~(Phoenix, Arizona:
Arizona Pioneer, Historical Society, 1955).
171.!2.!!!·. p. 12.
18

stout and Faulk, A Short History of the American West, pp. 46-47.

10

In the province of Sonora, where there was an abundance of silver,
the missions were generally found near the mines.

As one Jesuit father,

Joseph Och, states in his journals: "Mines or pits are so plentiful that
even if all the Spaniards busied themselves with mining they would not be
equal to the task."

19

This condition appears as a stark contrast to New

Mexico, which Nicolas de LaFora described as an area where the " silver
mines are of no great value."

20

The crown gave military support for mission activities with the
eventual establishment of presidios.

The mission-presidio complex was a

viable frontier institution for the crown, particularly as it was the
most economical means available to control the Indians.
Because of the close link of the mission and presidio system, the
Jesuits exercised great power on the frontier.

Ho>rever, the power of the

Jesuits soon was curtailed due to developments in Spain .

King Charles

III began a sweeping set of reforms to separate church and state, and the
order came under fire.

It began with a strict set of restrictions

governing the church's legal and economic privileges.

And then in the

summer of 1767, the Society of Jesus was expelled from the New World .

21

While the Jesuits had been relatively successful with most of the
Indian groups of New Spain, they were never able to reap any measurable
19
Theodor e E. Treutlein, Missionary in Sonora: The Travel Reports
of Joseph Och, S. J., 1755-1767 (San Francisco: California Histor ical
Society, 1965), p. 143.
20
Lawrence Kinnard, ed., The Frontiers of New Spain: Nicolas de
LaFora's Description, 1766-68 (Berkeley, Calif.: The Quivara Society,
1958), p. 95.
21
Lyle N. McAlister, The "Fuero Militar" in New Spain 1764-1800
hereafter cited as The "Feuw Militar 11 (Gainsville, Flori!'la: University
of Florida Press, 1957), p. 94.

11

amount of success among the Apaches.

This failure was due largely to the

nomadic nature of these Indians; the Apaches plainly refused to stay at
permanent locations by a mission.

For over a century they had been raid-

ing deep into Mexico, and the raids had become a basic economic and
social pursuit which was not easy to replace and not lightly surrendered.

22

With the expulsion of the Jesuits by Charles III, the Franciscans
and Dominicans had full supervision of the Indians spiritual needs.
However, the burden of controlling the hostile Apaches soon fell almost
entirely upon the military and the frontier institution of the presidio.
The Presidio System
The presidio, as it developed on the frontier of New Spain, wa s
neither novel in concept or in characteristics.
sidios appeared around 1570 in Morocco.

The first Spanish pre-

There it took on the added

dimension of being an enclave of Christianity in a heathen land, a
vestige which it retained in New Spain.

23

The first presidios were strategically situated along the principal roads to the silver mines of the north.

The first garrisons were

extremely small, but they doubled and re-doubled in size as the Indian
wars intensified.
22
23

In these isolated posts the troops were joined at

Ferris, Soldier and Brave, p. 15.

Max L. Moorhead, The Presidio: Bastian of the Spanish Borderlands
hllreafter cited as The Presidio, (Norman, Oklahoma: University o,f
Oklahoma Press, 1975), pp. 3-4.

12

first by their wives and children, and in time by civilians who gathered
in the area for greater protection from hostile Indians.

As the garrison

was reinforced and its royal payroll increased, the presidio became
especially attractive to merchants, stockmen and farmers.

At first,

a few friendly Indians added their presence to the fort to serve as
military scouts and domestic servants, since missionized villages were
almost always in the vicinity of a presidio.

Eventually, the presidio

was teeming with peaceful natives desirous of the work and protection
that the fort provided.

Thus, the presidio evolved from a simply

garrisoned fort to the nucleus of a civilian town.

24

The number of troops stationed at the different presidios varied,
but nearly all were undermanned.

The frontier troops were usually

militia units, although a few companies of regulars were in the area.
To combat the Indian hostilities, and to protect against invasion by
European rivals, the fuero militar was established in northern New
Spain.

This system granted Spanish military privileges in the New

World and attracted half-breeds and Indians into the northern militias
to alleviate the high costs of military defense.

With the influx of

enlistees seeking the new privileges, the provincial militias grew
rapidly.

By 1766, the number of Spanish regulars in all of New Spain

totaied only 2,341, while the provincial militias exceeded 9,000 men.
By 1784, as the Apache problems were increasing, the number of regulars
had nearly doubled to 4,389 men and the militia had grown to over
15,000.
24
23

25

Indian auxiliaries were also used to bolster troop strength

Ibid. , pp . 4-5.
McAlister, The "Fuero Militar," pp. 94-96.

13

in some areas.

There were about 1,400 armed Indian militiamen on the

frontier, located mostly in the province of Sonora.

26

The predominantly militia garrisons of frontier presidios suffered
from a lack of well-trained officers and men, and from sub-standard
equipment.

The men were not drilled on a regular basis and marksmanship

was poor due to a lack of practice.

The enl.fsted men were required to

purchase their own ammunition, hence they used very little of it on
target practice.
A shortage of equipment was a chronic ill of the presidio soldier.
For example, at the presidio of Tucson, a northern outpost on the
Sonora frontier,

each soldier was supposed to have been armed with a

regular musket, a lance, a bull-hide shield and an arrow-proof jacket
made out of heavy leather.

However, many of the muskets were not

serviceable and moreover, there were only sixty-four muskets for seventy-

three men.

There was also a shortage of lances and only twenty-one of

the leather jackets were available.

Even the presidio's hors e herd,

which was supposed to include six mounts per soldier, numbered only 356,
which was eighty-two shy of the minimum requirement.

27

The horse herds were vital to a well-functioning garrison.
were necessary for

~trol,

They

pursuit and campaigns against the Apaches.

Pastured near the presidios and difficult to guard, the horses were all
too often run off by the hostiles.
herds

~<ere

Since replacement costs were high, the

not brought back up to full strength very rapidly.

26
christian I. Archer, ''Pardoe, Indians and the Army of Ne~< Spain:
Inter-relationships and conflicts 1780-1810," Journal of Latin American
~ 6 (November, 1974)240-45.
27

Moorhead, The Apache Frontier, pp. 90-91.

14
The problem was so serious that Viceroy Galvez, in his Instructions of
1786, cautioned Ugarte to be especially attentive in guarding the horses.
He directed Ugarte to hold company commanders personally responsible for
all losses through theft.

28

Not only was equipment often substandard for the presidio soldier,
but he suffered economic hardships as well.

There were two reasons fo r

these problems; first of all a very low pay scale existed for the frontier troops, and secondly there was wide-spread corruption among the
officers who handled the payroll procedures.

In 1729, the yearly salary

of a presidio captain was 3,000 pesos a year,

second only to the salary

of a provincial governor.

In comparison, the enl is ted men received

from 290 to 350 pesos a year depending upon rank.

Prior to 1772, the

enlisted men were required to purchase their own uniforms, equipment
and maintain their horses in addition to providing for their famili es .

29

While monetary compensation for service was poor to begin with, the
enlisted man suffered even further due to the common practice of the
company captain acting as purchasing agent for the soldiers.

Because

of this arrangement, the captain would often purchase supplies a t
highly inflated prices and there was no recourse for the common soldier.
For example, in Nueva Vizcaya, Sonora and New Mexico the soldiers were
required to pay five pesos a bushel for wheat which had cost their
officers only one and a half pesos at most; for beef,

which the cap-

tains had bought at three or four pesos each, they were having to pay
28
29

worchester, Instructions, Article 22, p. 35.
Moorhead, The Presidio, p. 67.

15

eight pesos.

Horses, which initially cost from five to seven pesos were

being sold to the soldier at from ten to eleven pesos each.

30

The troops that manned frontier presidios comprised a unique branch
of the Spanish military system.

While their deficiency in military in-

struction and disregard for discipline appalled regular army officers,
their toughness and stamina was admired by their own officers.

The

presidia! soldier served for a term of ten years at a time, the actual
amount of duty he saw dependent upon Indian hostilities and needs of
the province.

31

As the Apache problem increased in the north, the

presidio played an ever-growing role in those provinces.

In order to

improv" lts situation c.n the frc.ntier, the crown instituted sweeping
changes in its military and Indian policies in the last half of the
eighteenth century in New Spain.

30

Ibid., pp. 57-58.

)!Ibid., pp. 178-79.

16

INITIAL INDIAN POLICIES 1766-1785
In 1766, the Marques de Rub1 arrived in New Spain for an inspection
tour of the military posts and conditions on the northern frontier.

This

expedition ushered in a period of intensified efforts to remedy the problem of defending the border against Indian attacks.

Rub{'s survey indi-

cated that there were a number of regions where the Apaches gained entrance into the northern provinces.

In order to secure the frontier from

further hostilities these entrances must be closed off.
feature of

32

The essential

Rub1's recommendations was the abandonment OC the missions

in eastern Texas and the withdrawal of the frontier line to the south.
He insisted that Spain was trying to maintain too much of a northern
boundary and had spread herself too thin.

33

Rub! proposed that a line

of fifteen presidios be set up on this reduced frontier and that everything north of that line be returned to the Indians for the time being.
He also recommended a war of extermination against the Apaches, judging
that this was the only way to end the problem permanently.

34

Rub! suggested that each presidio be garrisoned by fifty welltrained and well-equipped men who could carry war to the Apaches.

He

felt that this line of presidios should extend at intervals from Sonora
32

worchester, Instructions, p. 7.

33

Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (New York:
Dunlop, 1931), p. 129.
34

~.,

p. 130.

r,rossett a nd

17
to Texas.

These presidios would be approximately forty leagues apart

along this new frontier line.

35

Back in Spain, Rub!'s recommendations were given careful consideration.

The new plan that evolved out of these recommendations, the so-

called Reglamento, or New Regulations of Presidios, was not issued until
The Reglamento was to prove the forerunner of a broader set of

1772.

reforms that came four years leter.
Under the direction of Jose de Galvez, the northern provinces of
New Spain were separated into a new governmental district in August,
This new district, called the Provincias Internas, was formed to

1776.

create a better system for governing and defending the frontier.
Teodoro de Croix was given command over the new area and was delegated
authority to make all decisions in the provinces.

He was expected to

devote his full attention to warfare and leave the civil matters to the
local authorities.

36

The old system with the viceroy in charge had proven to be illsuited for keeping abreast of the Indian problems of the north

These

problems were very foreign to those the viceroy usually handled and he
was generally not well enough informed to direct operations against the
Apaches.

Also, most of the problems on the frontier were over a thousand

miles from the viceroy's headquarters in Mexico City, and so communications were time-consuming.

35
36

Bannon, Borderlands, p. 180.
worchester, Instructions, p. 12.

18
Croix arrived in the ~ovincias I nternas and assumed command in
1777.

His administration lasted until 1783, during which time he en-

joyed considerable success.

37

He held several councils of war with his

subordinates which helped identify the true dimensions of the problems
on the frontier.

In December of 1777 eleven men met under Croix's

direction at Monclova to discuss the problems of the

~ovincias

Internas.

The council discussed several questions, including the mture of the
Apache hostilities and what progress, if any, was being made against
them; how many warriors did the Apaches have, how well armed were they
and of what value would peace pacts be with them.

Also discussed was

th e type of military operations which might prove successful against the
Apa c hes, how many men would be needed and should alliances be attempted
with any other tribes against the Apaches. 38
While these questions showed how poorly informed the Spanish were
concerning the Apaches, they did show a desire to become more knowledgable about the situation.

There was a unanimous agreement among all

present at the council that while the Apaches were the Spanish's main
foe on the frontier, little progress had been made to subdue them; that
in fact conditions had steadily worsened, especially since the 1760's.
Most of the military commanders also felt that the realignment of the
presidios under Rub!'s RegZamento had been a mistake because the frontier settlements appeared to be even more vulnerable than before. 39
371.!!.!.!!·. p. 13.
38
39

Ibid., pp. 15-17.
rbid., p. 18.

19
The most striking decision of the council was that in the future
the Spanish should try to form an alliance with the Commanches.

This

was a very ironic move, since it was the Commanches, in search of ex-

panded territory, who had driven the Apaches into a position of hostility with the Spanish.

However, since the two tribes were mortal

enemies, the alliance appeared feasible to Croix.
~ch

The base for

an alliance had been laid by the governors of

New Mexico as early as 1749.

Governor Tomas Velez Capuch!n had main-

tained a casual peace with the marauding Commanches between 1749 and
1767.

It was Governor Juan Bautista de Anza (1777-1781) however, who

revived the old relationship and perfected it.

40

Under the direction

of Felipe de Neve, who succeeded Croix in 1782, Anza formed the Commanche Alliance.

The final peace was obtained by Domingo Cabello, the

governor of Texas, in October of 1785.

The terms were essentially the

same as those which Anza had established a few years before, and ineluded:
1.

The cessation of all hostile activities between the Spanish and

the Commanches.
2.

The release of all Spaniards held captive by the Commanches,

and their return to their own people.
3.

The exclusion of all Europeans except Spaniards from the

Commanche villages.
40
Moorhead, The Apache Frontier, p. 143. For further information
on Anza see also Alfred Barnaby Thomas, Forgotten Frontiers : A Studv
of the Spanish Indian Policy of Don Juan Bautista de Anza, Governor of
New Mexico, 1777-1787 (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press,
1932).

20

4.

The recognition by the Commanches of all friends or enemies

of the Spanish as their own.

5.

The prosecution of war by the Commanches against the Lipan

Apaches and the rendering of reports of all engagements to the Spanish.
6.

The admission of Commanches into Coahuila for the purpose of

attacking Apaches in that province.

7.

The annual distribution of presents to the Commanche chiefs

as a token of Spanish good will. 41
The Spanish in the ~ovincias Internas were well pleased with the
new alliance.

This closely followed the Spanish strategy of previous

decades, when they were masters of dividing and then conquering the
Indians of Latin America.

Not only did this new pact provide better

defense against the Apaches, but opened the way for trade with the
Commanches as well.
The Commanches began attacks on the Apaches as early as April of

1786.

They were as fond of the alliance as the Spanish, for it allowed

them unrestrained warfare against their old enemies the Apaches.

Indeed,

when the Lipan Apaches made overtures of peace to the governor of New
Mexico the Commanches begged Anza not to make a treaty with them, a r gu ing
that if he did they would have no one to fight and consequently would
become effeminatet

42

Spanish Indian policy in the ~ovincias Internas was soon to undergo more dramatic changes, for in 1785 Bernardo de Galvez and Jacobo
Ugarte y Loyola assumed their new positions in the area.
41

42

Ibid., pp. 144-46.
lbid .• pp. 160-61.

Between them,

21
these two men would shape the most effective Indian policy that was
ever used in the northern provinces of New Spain.

22

THE GllVEZ POLICY

Bernardo de Galvez seems to have understood the problems of the

Provinoias Internas as few of his predecessors had. 43

His instructions

to Ugarte show him to be a master of frontier know-how and Indian
relations.

As a veteran of frontier wars in Sonora and a former governor

of Louisiana, Galvez

knew the problems of the Interior Provinces and

understood well Indian psychology.

44

The Galvez Policy had some simi-

larities to earlier policies, but it contributed far more to the pacification of the frontier tribes than did the realignment of the presidios or even the reinforcement of their garrisons.

The policy was

clearly laid down in the instructions to Ugarte, and involved swift
and vigorous war against Indians who were hostile, peace among those
who solicited it, and an attempt to win allies among the warlike nations
by spreading the use of Spanish foods, drinks, weapons and customs among
them. 45
In New Mexico particularly, great success was achieved by following
the Galvez Policy.

The Commanches had previously been pacified and

proved to be effective allies.

Ugar te and Anza were able to sustain the

peace for a full generation, and this in conjunction with their successful employment of the rest of the ~licy brought peace to New Mexico for
the fi rst tl.me during the Spanish occupation.
43
44
45

Bannon, Borderlands, p. 187.
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worchester, Instructions, p. 23.
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The official title of the Galvez Policy was Instructions for
Governing the Interior Provinces of New Spain.

Written in 1786, the

instructions were to be strictly observed by the military commanders of
the Provinoias Internas in dealing with the Indians and other military
matters.

The set of instructions were divided in several categories.

First, a section of general information specified ways to handle the
overall Indian problems, and then shorter sections outlined detailed
instructions for each province.

The Instructions contained 216 articies

in all, and were finalized in Mexico City on August 26, 1787.
In the beginning of his instructions Galvez recognized that an un-

happy state of affairs existed in the Interior Provinces due to the
Indian problem.

He stated that his purpose in drawing up this set of

instructions was to form a clear and methodical plan for handling the
situation.

46

It was essential that he established a clear plan, for this

was one feature that past Spanish Indian policies had often lacked.
Galvez first noted the problems involved in attempting to control
such a vast area as the Frovinoi as In t ernas.

He pointed out that it

was too large to be governed by one man and urged his senior officers to
make full use of their powers.

However, they were still required to

make full reports of all activities to him on a regular basis.

47

This

feature was essential, for without good communications from the frontier

areas it would have been impossible for Galvez to coordinate efficiently
any programs.
46
47

Articles nine through twenty divided up the provinces

Ibid., pp. 27-28.
Ibid., Articles 1-3, p. 30.
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between Ugarte and the other senior officer, Juan de Ugalde .

48

For pur-

poses of swift pursuit and punishment of raiders it was extremely important to Galvez that his officers had a free hand in making decisions.
The failure to act quickly could abort the possibilities of a successful
campaign.

Viceroy Galvez went on to urge all commanders to let the Indians
destroy themselves if at all possible.

As he recalled, no large

European armies had taken part in the conquest of Mexico, but that the
Indians were merely left to contribute to their own "happy ruin." 49
This policy was far more feasible economically for the crown, and also

recognized the physical obstacles faced by trying to militarily control
the Indians.

Galvez realized that some discord already existed among

the tribes, and therefore urged Ugarte and Ugalde to exploit this as far
as possible.

50

The commanders are instructed to secure peace with the Apaches if at

all possible.

Galvez pointed out, however, that the Indians had been

fickle and acted in bad faith in keeping past treaties.

He also recog-

nized that the Spanish had not always respected the peace pacts either.
The Viceroy felt that peace was based on private interests and so the
Spanish had to be able to offer the Apaches something in return for a
cessation of hostilities.

The goods to be offered were to include

horses and mules, food and obsolete guns to hunt with.
48
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that if the Apaches desired these items then they would be peaceful with
the Spanish.

He deemed that it would be much cheaper for the king to

satisfy these material needs than to fight the Indians.
In article forty-eight the f rontier commanders were warned of the
volatile character of the Apaches and to expect the peace to be broken
numerous times.

However, regardless

of this they were ordered to make

all necessary efforts to promote peace a nd when rebellious Indians again
sought peace it was to be offered to them.

52

Galvez concluded this sec-

tion of his instructions by stating that he did not personally feel the
Apaches would submit voluntarily and that force would likely be required,
however he recommended attempts at peaceful solutions be tried first. 53
In articles sixty-four through sixty-six Galvez urged his officers
to acquaint the Apaches with liquor.

He pointed out that the northern

tribes had already acquired a taste for alcoholic beverages and perhaps
a similar fondness among the Apaches would serve Spain's best interests.

It was felt that once the Apaches became accustomed to the use of liquor
they would then be dependent upon the Spanish to furnish it.

Perhaps

i f the alcoho l served no other purpose, i t was hoped it would loosen

the Indians' tongues, for article sixty-seven implied that when the
Indians were drunk they may confide their secrets to the Spanish. 5 4
In line with the plan to supply the Apaches with guns for hunting,
Galvez also felt this would be of benefit to the Spanish militarily.
Prior to this the Spaniards had been at a disadvantage when engaged in
52
53
54
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warfare with the Indians because their muskets were more difficult to
reload than the

warrio~'s

bows.

Therefore, it was felt that if the

Apaches were provided with obsolete guns the Spanish soldiers would gain
at least equal ground.

Furthermore, when the guns needed to be repaired

the Apaches would be dependent on the Spanish to fix them. 5 5
In his final enunciation of general Indian policy, Viceroy Galvez
encouraged his officers to continue the practice of presenting the
Indians with gifts.

He felt that this policy would promote good will

and keep open any possible avenues for peace. 5 6

In essence, this new

Indian policy recognized that in the past the hostiles made peace only
to obtain gifts and then resumed warfare.

It was now hoped that by

creating a desire for many Spanish items the Indians would maintain the
peace so they could obtain the food, horses and guns that they craved.
Following the untimely death of Galvez late in 1786, the burden of
applying the new policy fell on Ugarte.
~ovincias

The new viceroy split the

Internas in much the same way Galvez had intended, and Ugarte

was put in charge of the provinces of Sonora, Nueva
Mexico.

Vizcaya and New

These western areas bore the brunt of the Apache threat and so

were most applicable to the Galvez plan.
During the next few years Ugarte proved to be
the policy.

a strong enforcer of

He devoted his full attention to the Apache problem and by

1790, when he was replaced, he had had a good amount of success.

Ugarte

had the patience and wisdom necessary to pursue the policy although
55
56
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he was continually hampered by administrative reorganizations.

In

accordance with the directions of Galvez, Ugarte actively sought peace
whenever possible and resorted to military action only when there was
no other alternative.

By the spring of 1787 the Commanche, Ute and

Navajo nations had not only made peace but now acted as allies of the
Spanish against the Apaches.

Within a few months, large groups of

Apaches had sued for peace and settled in reservation-like encampments
near the frontier presidios.

57
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Moorhead, The Presidio, pp. 108-109.
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SUMMARY

There were several reasons for the immediate success of the Galvez

Policy.

First of all the chain of cooonand had been restructured and

the senior officers were given more power to control their districts.
Because of this change the Spanish were able to facilitate ioonediate
reprisals against marauding Apaches.

The cooonunications with the

Viceroy had always been a problem and so this eliminated that weakness.
Also, while earlier policies had considered peace negotiations, they
generally tended to act more in line with a plan of extermination.
Galvez

personally felt that military action would be needed, but

strongly advocated using peaceful means if at all possible.

The program

of orienting the Indians to the use of Spanish goods and an annual
distribution of presents was very successful.

The policy of buying

peace proved to be much sounder than earlier attempts at military victory had been.
It took nearly ten years for the Galvez Policy to be fully into
effect, but there was a growing conv iction among the Spaniards by 1796
that the long, cruel war with the Apaches was about to end.

It was

also recognized that the peace that existed was not brought about by the
former policies of enslavement and annihilat ion but by the wise maxims
of the Instrucci6n of l786
economic enticements. 5

8

which had combined mJ litary pressur e with

While the optimism for total peace in 1796

was short-lived, it's failure was brought on by external forces and not
a short-coming with the Galvez Policy.
58
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In 1810, the insurrection broke out which was to become Mexico's
war for independence.

This diverted troops and funds to the centers of

rebellion and forced the frontier areas to operate on a reduc ed budget.
The distribution of gifts and supplies dropped off drastically and at
several presidios the Indians fled and resumed raiding.

The Apaches had

always had a fundamental aversion to the sedentary life, and this
coupled with their inability to comprehend the new inconsistencies in
Spanish policy led to their disenchantment.

59

Furthermore, after inde-

pendence had been achieved the new Mexican government did not have the
money to restore the old system or to properly maintain the presidios. 60
The Galvez plan had worked from its inception in 1786 to 1810.

The

overall goal of the plan had been to pacify the frontier of New Spain ,
and this was accomplished in large measure for duration of the effective
use of the policy.

It was during these years of purchased peace that

most of the beautiful missions were constructed, that ranching in the
area flourished and the northern provinces really grew . 61

The policy

which Galvez designed and Ugarte helped institute brought more peace
and stability to the Interior Provinces than had been previously experienced.

The plan's success reflected its value to Spanish Indian

policy on the frontier.

59
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APPENDIX

33

Expansion of the Presidio Garrisons--1700's
12ll--19 Presidios manned by 1,006 officers and men
1787--23 Presidios manned by 3,087 officers and men

62

One of the most notable characteristics of fue presidia! company
was its tendency toward rapid expansion.

During the sixty-four years

represented here the total force on the frontier had increased 206
percent.

However, even with this rapid growth the Frovincias Internas

were still undermanned.

Racial Mix of the Presidio Garrisons 1773-1781
Caucasians (Europeans or Creoles)--50 percent
Mixed bloods--37 percent

~ndian Auxiliaries--13 percent 63
While these percentages represent the average presidia! company
on the frontier, there were exceptions.

For example in eastern Texas

the garrisons were entirely caucasians, while at the same time in

Sonora there was a larger percent of Indian auxiliaries.

There was a

marked tendency for the western and central garrisons to be less
caucasian than those farther east.
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